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ISSN # 1072-9496ABSTRACT
This working paper is one of a series the EPAT/MUCIA Population
and Environmental and Natural Resources team is producing.  It
examines major ways of thinking about the population-environment
relationship over the past two centuries.  The paper begins with
Malthus and reviews developments to the present.  Then it
examines in detail six current frameworks or models for analyzing
population-environment relationships.  The six models include
Bongaarts', Clark's, and Harrison's attempts to identify the
relative impact of population growth on a limited number of forms
of environmental degradation.  It also examines the more complex
Meadows, Meadows, and Randers WORLD3 dynamic model of the global
system and International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) population-environment model now being applied to
Mauritius.
A basic finding of these models is that population growth can
have a major impact on the environment.  However, the impact is
never simple and direct, and human organization always moderates
its effect.  Further, we cannot expect that slowing population
growth will alleviate environmental pressures in the near term.
Finally, achieving sustainable development will require a
combined attack on population growth, consumption, and a variety
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Rapid population growth is one of the most dramatic conditions of
modern life.  The world's population is now about 5.4 billion,
and growing at just under 2% per year.  Never before has the
human population grown so rapidly or reached such large absolute
numbers.
This growth is both good and bad news.  On the positive side, it
represents a major triumph over death and disease and the limits
the earth might place on extracting its resources.  Modern
technology has kept people alive longer and in better health than
ever before.  It has also made human labor vastly more
productive.  Modern economic development, based on fossil fuels,
demonstrates the success of the human species in carving out a
niche for itself.
Success has a cost, however.  And it may be far greater than even
the most severe pessimist has imagined.  Fossil fuel technology,
and the human growth that it implies, constitutes a massive
assault on the natural environment.  Modern production and
consumption greatly increase the emission of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.  This threatens to raise the earth's global
temperature faster than in the past and to unprecedented levels.
Other unnatural gases, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), have
dramatically reduced stratospheric ozone and increased
ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth's surface.  This
threatens both human health by causing skin cancer and visual
impairment and, more importantly, by affecting the food chain.
Thousands of new chemicals are assaulting the earth, air, and
water.  Some of the new chemicals are extremely toxic and natural
biological processes cannot degrade them.  Finally, increased
population translates into increased demand for land.
Deforestation and desertification result when people invade
marginal lands with technologies that degrade rather than protect
the land.
Thus, there is a clear historical association between population
growth and environmental degradation.  The transformation to a
fossil fuel technology occurred at the end of the 18th century,
accompanied by development of modern urban industrial society and
a substantial population increase.  This occurred first in theNorth Atlantic countries, then spread to the rest of the world.
Historically, fossil fuel consumption, urbanization and
industrialization, and population growth are associated with one
another.
Association is not the same as causation, however.  Therefore,
the question remains: what impact does population growth have on
the environment?  How much?  In what ways?  Further, what policy
options are available to deal with population growth and to
mitigate whatever environmental impacts it has?  This paper
addresses these issues.
The paper represents one of a series that the EPAT/MUCIA
Population and Environmental and Natural Resources team is
producing.  It begins by reviewing past and current models or
frameworks that show how we think about the population-
environment relationship.  Subsequent papers will examine what we
know about this relationship in the specific areas of land use,
health, women, and development.  A final paper will use all of
these findings to develop a specific research agenda for the
future.
In this paper we make a basic argument to be carried through
subsequent papers. There is no simple and direct relationship
between population and environment.  Identifiable forms of
technology and social organization mediate impacts in both
directions.  It is only through these that either population or
environment affect one another.
FRAMEWORKS
This paper begins our analysis of the population-environment
relationship by examining a number of ways of thinking about that
relationship.  Whether called conceptual schemes, frameworks,
models, or theories, they are all simply ideas about the
relationship between population and the environment.  They differ
in the extent that they specify both the elements in the
relationship and the linkages that bind the elements together.
There is a major problem that plagues all of these ways of
thinking, and it becomes more pronounced with the elaboration of
modern scientific disciplines.  It has to do with what we have
called a series of imbalances (Ness, Brechin, and Drake 1992)
between the concepts population and environment, making it
difficult to deal with them together.  There are conceptual and
organizational imbalances, and an imbalance in the sensitivity or
negotiability of the two concepts.  All of these imbalances make
it difficult to think clearly and systematically about the
population-environment relationship.
Conceptually, population, or more accurately, the demographic
analysis of population, is relatively simple.  Six variables and
stable population theory permit demographers to deal with
population as a condition in something like a closed system.
Births, deaths, and migration constitute dynamic variables, andsize, age-gender distribution, and geographic distribution are
comparative static variables.  These constitute a powerful set of
variables, from which we can perform analyses without involving
other extraneous or environmental conditions.  The environment
could not be more different.  It is much more complex, bounded
by, yet including earth, air, water and everything that connects
them.
Today's population projections, reasonably accurate for the next
20 to 30 years (Lee 1991), almost totally neglect any
environmental conditions or changes.  For example, the current UN
projections (United Nations 1990) imply that Africa's population
will double from roughly 800 million to 1.6 billion by the year
2025.  These projections do not take into account declining per
capita cereal output, increased foreign exchange requirements for
food imports, chronic warfare-induced famine, or AIDS.  For
developed countries and Asia and Latin America, the current
projections may be valid, attesting to the power of demographic
concepts and models.  It is unclear how Africa, even with great
assistance from the rest of the world, will be able to support
1.6 billion people.
Organizationally, there is a parallel distinction.  One
discipline, demography, represents population that is not closely
related to any other [note 1].  But where is the environment?
What discipline encompasses the environment?  None, and all.
Every discipline from atmospheric science and anthropology to
sociology and zoology covers the environment.  These disciplines
have become political organizations. Gatekeepers, journals,
professional meetings, language, credentials and other symbolic
boundary markers maintain their artificial boundaries.  The
development of scientific disciplines has increased our powers of
observation and understanding immensely.  But these disciplines
have also inadvertently worked to reduce communication among
their members.  Again, population has one of these disciplines.
The environment has many, greatly increasing interdisciplinary
communication problems.
Finally, in what we call sensitivity or negotiability, we reverse
the differentials.  Here, environmental issues are more simple or
negotiable.  They often come down to cost-benefit relationships
with negotiable margins.  A carbon tax can encourage people to
use less fossil fuel.  Bottle deposits can increase recycling.
Research and development can bring cheaper, cleaner fuels.  In
all these cases, we can calculate the costs and benefits, often
at the margins.  Negotiations at the margins can lead to greater
environmental protection.
Population issues are far less negotiable because they have
become almost totally invested with value.  Population touches on
some of the primordial values human kind holds most deeply.
These include race and ethnic identity, gender relations, human
sexuality, and human morality.  Our most fundamental human
institutions, those we call religion, articulate and contain
these values.  We see today that Serbs, Croats, Muslims,
Israelis, Palestinians, and many others, cannot bargain because
they believe that their very identity is at stake.  One cannot
bargain away one's identity.  These fundamental values, which
defy rational calculation also bind up sexuality.  Marguerite
Halloway (1992), for example, provides a recent summary of thepopulation controversy that surfaced and was quickly buried at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
In short, we can approach environmental issues through marginal
analysis and bargaining.  Population issues often deny such
bargaining potential.  In many ways, population issues are today
highly controversial.
Despite the difficulty, thinking about population-environment
relationships has been at the center of many problems confronted
by modern, urban-industrial society.  In this paper, we shall
attempt to summarize some of the broader historical patterns of
thinking in Section A on "Past Thinking."  Section B concerns
recent developments.  We shall show how post World War II changes
in world community organizations have led to greater
concentration on the population-environment relationship.  In
addition, observation and theory in the scientific disciplines
had an impact on the change of focus.   Finally, Section C
examines a series of recent models, based on the general
framework of human ecology.  These models try to grapple with the
rich complexity of the population-environment relationship in a
rigorous and systematic fashion.
In the final analysis, we shall make two basic points.  The first
is that there is no simple, direct relationship between
population and the environment.  No population condition or
dynamic has a direct impact on the environment.  Conversely, no
environmental condition has a direct impact on  population.  All
relationships between population and the environment filter
through some form of technology and social organization.  This
argues strongly against the idea that there is any single
"population problem."  We shall show some evidence that "solving"
the problem of rapid population growth in the developing world
will not solve the problem of the population-environment
relationship.
Second, we shall argue that there are some truly global problems,
such as atmospheric change and the potential for global warming,
or stratospheric ozone destruction.  However, the population-
environment relationship is, for the most, part a local or
regional issue.  Nations differ; even more, smaller local
populations within nations differ in the pattern of their
population-environment relationships.  This conclusion has
especially important implications for the kind of interventions
USAID or the world development assistance community can design
and carry out.  We must make whatever models or frameworks exist
for dealing with population-environment relationships relevant to
specific locations.  This is the only way they will be helpful in
designing interventions.  This calls for highly location-specific
research projects and interventions.
Past Thinking
Few people will recall today that Malthus directed his famous
1798 essay, "On Population," at William Godwin.  Though the essay
reflected a distinctive perspective on population-environmentrelationships, it was even more important as a change in
fundamental political philosophy.  Godwin was one of the last of
the 18th century rationalists.  Frederick Heer (1964) called
Malthus (along with Burke) one of the first great 19th century
conservative philosophers.
Malthus' essay was an attack on the rationalist position that we
can perfect human society.  Improving the lot of humans, Malthus
argued, would simply increase population growth beyond the
earth's carrying capacity and lead to greater misery and
mortality.  In turn, this would lower population below that
threshold.  The essay began a long debate, splitting much of the
British (and some continental) intellectual class for a
generation, basically along progressive and conservative lines.
This observation is of more than academic interest.  We can hear
many of the elements in that great Malthus-Godwin debate today.
Some have profoundly influenced population policy in some
developing countries.  Godwin argued for specific institutional
changes to improve human life.  These changes include extending
the right to vote, reducing church lands, expanding education,
and giving equal rights to women [note 2].   Godwin went much
further, as well, working out and presenting, what has been
called the first fully philosophical anarchist position.  For
Godwin, all institutions enslaved people and should be abolished.
Without such constraints, he argued, the human mind could work,
through reason, the steps necessary to continue improving human
society.  Many of Godwin's proposals have, in fact, materialized.
Political and social reforms have increased equality, and
population has grown along with increased human welfare.  From
this perspective, his vision was far more powerfully predictive
than Malthus' dire predictions of doom.  Godwin might well
complain that few today even know his name.
Having recently discovered the magic of compound interest,
Malthus found a strong argument against the rationalists'
proposals [note 3].  Population has the capacity to grow by
geometric progression, while food output can only grow by
arithmetic progression.  Thus, population would always press on
the food supply.  Only vice and misery could hold population in
check.  In subsequent editions of his essay, after he was
married, Malthus discovered moral restraint and added this to the
list of checks on population growth.  In the 20th century,
neo-Malthusians took up his concern for population growth and
promoted the use of restraint.  These were the forerunners of the
modern birth control movement.
Esther Boserup (1965, 1981) represents an anti-Malthusian
perspective that, in some sense, specifies the connection Godwin
saw in more general terms.  Boserup holds that, historically,
population growth has pushed individuals and groups to develop
new and more productive technologies to extract more resources
from the environment.  Malthus assumed technology, like "the
passions," to be a given.  Boserup observes the historical
increase in the extractive capacity of human technology and
proposes that the pressures of population growth have driven a
great deal of the increase.
There was another line of conflict with modern repercussions as
well.  Marx poured caustic criticism on Malthus, arguing that theonly problem was capitalism and not population growth.  A
communist revolution would end the slavery of private property,
on which capitalism was built, and lead to a (rather Godwinian)
rational adjustment of population to the land's resources.  More
than a century later, China's population policy showed wild
swings from 1953 to 1972, as the leadership shifted from red (or
revolutionary) to expert (or industrial engineer) positions, with
Mao following faithfully Marx's attack on Malthus' position on
population pressure.  Only after Mao's fall did the expert
position win to produce one of the world's most successful, and
coercive, modern fertility control programs (Ness and Ando 1984).
Malthus' essay marks the beginning of two centuries of concern
with the population-environment relationship.  These two
centuries are, however, marked by quite different positions in
major patterns of thought.  Until 1850, the problem was that of
population growth pressing on resources, especially on land.  By
1850, labor overtook land as a major development resource in the
rising industrial system.  Output increased greatly and reduced
the fear that population growth would outrun environmental
resources.  For the first half of the 20th century, declining
fertility led to a fear of stagnation and decline.  This fear
even took on a sinister character as elites saw fertility
differentials develop along class lines.  They feared that the
higher fertility of the lower classes would lead to a diminishing
quality of society.  The Nazis took this fear to a bloody
conclusion when they defined the issue by "race" rather than
class.
One of the few to voice concern with population growth at this
time was P. K. Watal, an Indian demographer.  In 1917, he warned
of the possibility of disastrous population pressures in India.
His position, stated again in the 1930s, provided a foundation
for the Congress party's policy goal of reduced fertility.  This
was adopted as official policy in the late 1930s.  India, using
this policy, became the first country to break with long standing
official pronatalist policies and led the modern antinatalist
policy revolution.  (Ness and Ando 1984, chapter 3.)
The lines of arguments and their adoption by various classes have
not been uniform, of course, and have often produced some strange
bedfellows.  On the role of population and its growth, for
example, we find such people as Godwin, Marx, Mao, and Julian
Simon holding very much the same technological-rationalist
position.
Environmental thinking, especially in the form of a conservation
ideology, has a similarly long pedigree (Grove 1990, 1992).  The
development of new exploiting technologies accompanied Western
imperialism as the new industrial system required more and more
natural resources.  But explorers and natural scientists came
along with the imperialist expansion.  They brought with them a
different way of seeing and thinking.  As naturalists and
ecologists, they saw the environmentally destructive impact of
the diggers and cutters who brought the resources that the new
industrial system needed.  These naturalists, driven partly by
romantic notions of "natural man," mobilized early sentiments for
environmental protection.  Some of the early environmental
protection movements, reflected today in forest preserves, grew
out of these forces.  They also produced arguments for theprotection of biodiversity that reverberate today in movements
for environmental protection.
Recent Developments
Modern thinking on the population-environment relationship
reflects some continuity with Malthus' original formulation of
population growth and environmental stress.  A number of
organizational, disciplinary, and methodological developments
have both advanced and retarded systematic thinking about the
population-environment relationship.  We must review these
briefly before examining some of the more important current
frameworks for dealing with the relationships.  Our basic
argument is that population and the many different elements that
make up the environment have each developed powerful
specializations.  This specialization promotes the detailed
analysis of each of the elements, but it also retards dealing
with the interconnections among them.
Organizational Movements
Out of the violence of World War II emerged something of a new
world community that was increasingly reflected in the structure
of the United Nations and the growth of many new international
governmental, non-governmental, and business organizations
(Singer 1970, Jacobson 1984, Ness and Brechin 1988).  Although it
will be an oversimplification, it is possible to identify in this
new world community a sequence of fundamental issues and their
organizational components and to make a case for their logical
connection over time.
The major issue that emerged after 1945 was world security.  The
UN Security Council was a major arena for articulating this
issue.  The coming of the cold war only intensified concern for
the security issue, which dominated the world stage through the
1950s.  Physical reconstruction and economic development
paralleled the security issue after the war.  The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE), and for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) were
important organizational reflections of these interests.  There
is another related development here that we should note, even
though we do not have space to develop the point.  The postwar
move toward decolonization produced a number of new states,
especially in Asia and Africa.  This move stimulated intellectual
and program-related interest in economic development.
By the 1960s, interest in development had increased considerably,
partly legitimized by the argument that security requires greater
international economic equality.  This interest found a home in
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and
in the new foreign aid programs emerging among the major donor
nations.  During this period, for example, the United States was
the world's leading donor of foreign aid, and the names of its
aid agencies reflect the changes proposed here.  We went from the
Mutual Security Agency to the Technical Cooperation Agency to theAgency for International Development.
Both the successes and the failures of development assistance led
directly to a concern for rapid population growth.  Though there
was much resistance to including population planning, especially
fertility control, in the agenda of international assistance, a
breakthrough finally occurred in 1965 and 1966.  The U.N.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (now the Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, or ESCAP) in 1965
and the UN General Assembly in 1966 passed enabling resolutions
(Symonds and Carder 1972, Ness and Ando 1984).  These United
Nations' resolutions legitimized including population planning in
international development assistance.  At the same time, the
United States' decision to fund international population
assistance provided the financial resources.  Offices of
Population appeared in foreign aid agencies.  In addition, the
United Nations created a trust fund in 1967 and the Fund for
Population Activities in 1969.  Funding for international
population assistance rose slowly to $100 million (in constant
1985 dollars) from 1952 to 1968.  From 1968 to 1972, funding
jumped from $100 to $400 million and has remained roughly
constant at that level (UNFPA 1992).
While international population planning programs and assistance
moved ahead rapidly in the 1970s, concern for environmental
degradation appeared on the horizon and was added, reluctantly
and weakly, to the international agenda.  The 1972 Stockholm
conference articulated some of the issues, including the great
division between more and less developed countries that persists
today.  It also led to the formation of the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), providing organizational resources to
support the growth of environmental interests.  Many countries
paralleled this effort by forming environmental protection
agencies.  For example, there were only 10 countries with
environmental protection agencies at the time of the 1972
Stockholm conference.  Today there are more than 100 (Meadows,
Meadows, and Randers 1992).
Thus, over the past four decades and more, both population and
environmental issues have come to occupy important and
distinctive positions in the international and national policy
arenas.  The growth of specific organizations both marks the
emergence of these issues on the policy agenda and promotes theirand
articulation.  Disciplinary development in both
theory and methodology have paralleled organizational
developments.
Theoretical and Methodological Developments
Demography has occupied the position of a special scientific
discipline for more than a century.  In the United States, it has
developed principally within sociology.  However, economics and
geography also have sub-disciplines that encompass demography.
The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population
(IUSSP) was formed around the turn of the century and represents
one of the oldest international professional associations.
Theoretical developments include the life tables and stable
population theory, which have provided tools for population
projections that now play an important role in linking populationwith other environmental issues.  Along with these developments
have come improvements in observation and data analysis
technology.
Censuses have expanded greatly, especially since 1945, in both
coverage and accuracy.  And they have come to have a great impact
on policy.  The 1960-61 round of Asian population censuses, for
example, was instrumental in pushing many countries to adopt
modern antinatalist population policies.  This was before the
western world and the UN were ready to provide support for the
programs that followed the policy decisions.  This development
was especially pronounced in India (Ness and Ando 1984, chapters
2 and 3).
In addition, the large scale area probability sample social
survey was applied to population issues, and had an impact on the
development of modern population programs.  More specifically,
the Knowledge-Attitude-Practice (KAP) survey became a standard
tool.  It was used both as a base-line survey and a tool for
evaluating programs in all of the world's modern family planning
programs.  Computer technology greatly enhanced the capacities of
social scientists to manipulate numbers, permitting extensive and
sophisticated analyses of field observations.
In addition to these theoretical and methodological developments,
there has been what can only be called a revolutionary
breakthrough in contraceptive technology.  The intrauterine
contraceptive device (IUD), oral contraceptives, injections, and
new methods of sterilization only became generally available
during the 1960s.  This technology is highly compatible with the
developments in demography and with the organizational
developments.  It essentially gives governments something they
can do to affect human  reproduction if they make the policy
decision to do so.
Both the theoretical and methodological developments, as well as
the technological breakthrough, have made demography a powerful
analytical tool.  Together they provide a great deal of support
for the extensive world of modern family planning programs that
have grown to become one of the world's largest and most
extensive public health interventions.  These programs have had a
substantial impact  on human fertility and have undoubtedly
hastened the decline of fertility in many less developed
countries.  The controversy that surrounds this statement has
largely given way to consensus.  Kingsley Davis' 1969 article in
SCIENCE, Donald Warwick's "Bitter Pills" (1982), and Hernandez'
SUCCESS OR FAILURE (1984) argued against the independent impact
of national family planning programs on human fertility.  These
have now almost completely given way to recognizing the
substantial and distinct impact such programs can have
(Bongaarts, Mauldin, and Phillips 1990).
Theoretical and methodological developments in environmental
issues are much more difficult to document, primarily because the
environment is so many things.  It is located in a great variety
of scientific disciplines, including agriculture, agronomy,
atmospheric sciences, biology, forestry, geography, geology,
limnology, meteorology, oceanography, physics, public health, and
zoology, to name just a few, plus all of the social sciences.
Each of these disciplines has developed its own specialized setof theories and methods.  Each has also established a set of
national and international organizations that provide a political
structure both binding the discipline together and cutting it off
from others.  For some of these disciplines, parallel national
and international governmental agencies play important roles in
the world of international development assistance.  Many, such as
agriculture, health, irrigation, industry, forestry,
transportation and a variety of utilities, can point to
substantial successes in the world of international development
assistance.  Furthermore, their organizational and technological
cohesion can often protect them from embarrassment when their
development projects end in failure or even disaster.
Our basic observation from this near half-century of
organizational, theoretical and methodological developments is
twofold.  First, all of the individual disciplines have developed
great powers of observation and analysis.  Further, these
analytical powers have often had substantial engineering
potential, permitting us to intervene in human and natural
processes with deliberate attempts to achieve highly specific
goals.  Sometimes those goals have been laudable and sometimes
the inter-ventions have been successful.  Second, however, the
power of the disciplines has also made their practitioners
unable, and often unwilling, to attend to relevant developments
in other disciplines.
This is most evident across the population-environment divide.
Attempts to cross the divide are few and cannot boast much
success.  Indonesia created a Ministry for Population and
Environment a decade ago to try to link these important issues.
Although headed by one of Indonesia's most intelligent leaders,
Emil Salim, it is structurally weak (a state or staff ministry
rather than a line or operational ministry).  It can show little
more than a few provincial level reports, and the creation of
local academic research centers, for its years of activity.  The
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has also supported some
activities in population and environment.  But, these cannot show
much success, especially when compared with the impact of
specialized fertility-limiting program assistance.
The most dramatic evidence of the divide between population and
environment came with the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED).  Indonesia's Emil Salim
argued strongly for including population issues in the UNCED
preparatory meetings.  Maurice Strong, UNCED's General Secretary,
supported the appeal, and the UNFPA prepared an extensive
document on population-environment dynamics.  In the final
analysis, however, UNCED almost totally ignored population issues
in its public pronouncements and resolutions.  Agenda 21 devotes
only 15 of its 800 pages to population, in Chapter 5.  This is a
significant statement and its inclusion in the formal document of
the Conference will certainly have important research and policy
implications.  But, equally telling, is the silence on the
population issue in the Conference's public stance.
The UNCED experience illustrates one of the more stubborn
problems in linking population and environment.  In addition to
the divisions sustained by scientific and organizational
specialization,  population issues suffer from acute political
sensitivity, which we noted above, but should repeat.  Ethnic,racial, and gender differences, as well as issues of human
sexuality, all intrude upon population issues.  All touch on some
of the most fundamental human sentiments.  All are embedded in
religious institutions and reflect ultimate societal values.  One
need not search far for evidence of these deep conflicts around
population issues.  The fierce resistance of the Roman Catholic
Church to modern forms of fertility limitation and the broad and
often violent resistance to abortion testify to the depths of the
conflict and the difficulties of resolution.  It is easy tothe desire of
many environmental groups to stay out of
this battleground.
Despite the deep divisions between population and environmental
groups and disciplines, it is difficult to deny the relationship
between population and environmental conditions in the real
world.  This empirical intrusion has led to some attempts to link
the two in models and frameworks.  We turn now to a brief review
of some examples.
Current Attempts: Models and Frameworks
Over the past decade or two, scientists have attempted many times
to develop frameworks and models for examining the relationship
between population and the environment.  Although they do not
explicitly cite the heritage, all reflect the basic perspective
developed in HUMAN ECOLOGY some decades ago (Hawley 1950, Duncan
1964).  This perspective begins with the observation of a
population in a territory or environment.  It assumes that
populations constantly interact with, adapt to and adapt their
environments.  In all cases, this two-way adaptation is mediated
by some form of organization, and technology.  (Population,
Organization, Environment, and Technology form the acronym POET
by which this paradigm is known in human ecology.)  The argument
is that all forms of life display this population-environment
interaction.  However, in most non-human forms, the organization
and technology are genetically programmed and thus of relatively
limited variability.  The highly generalized nature of the human
species implies that little is genetically programmed.  Most
forms of organization and technology are external to the
organism.  They have come to be highly variable in their
development and equally highly visible to observers.
This general perspective can be diagrammed as shown in figure 1.
Our diagram was developed in Ness, Brechin, and Drake (1992) to
deal with the current attempt to understand the population-
environment dynamic.  It differs slightly from the more
traditional human ecology framework by specifying an outcome.
But it sustains the most important aspect of the basic framework
in arguing that all population-environment interactions are
mediated by some form of organization and technology.  That is,
the most important linking arrow in this diagram is the one that
is not there.  This argues that:
There is no direct relationship between population and the
environment.  All impacts of population on the environment, or of
the environment on population, are the result of the social
organization and the human technology found in specific human groups.In the following section, we review six models or frameworks,
which provide good illustrations of the type of work that is
currently being done.  The first five models are formal
statements about population-environment relations, including
actual data and calculations.  The first three all attempt to
estimate the relative impacts of population growth, technology,
and consumption on one single environmental condition.  These are
all simple models in that they do not consider feedback processes
or linkages among the conditions that impact the environment.
All of these simple models reflect the basic human ecology
proposition that some form of technology and organization mediate
all population-environment relationships.  Even these simple
models can be enlightening.  In reviewing the models and
frameworks, we shall make brief statements of their research
implications and develop them more fully in a subsequent paper.
The fourth model is the more sophisticated, multisector dynamic
model, WORLD3, used in the LIMITS TO GROWTH study published in
1972.  Meadows, Meadows, and Randers recently reexamined and
slightly revised the model in a new edition,  BEYOND THE LIMITS
(1992).  This is a very important piece of work, sure to be a
common topic in environmental policy debates over the coming
years.  The fifth is the IIASA model, being applied to Mauritius.
This is the most developed of all the models and is probably the
most appropriate for more systematic empirical research on the
problem.
The sixth and final model is a sophisticated multi-sector
framework, from which we can work out relations in specific
sectors or arenas.  In all of these multisectoral models, we can
differentiate both population and environment by a number of
characteristics.  This will lead to much greater potential  for
tracing more complex connections.
After reviewing these six models, we shall make a few
observations on two other important issues that emerge from the
models.  One concerns the issue of scale, the other concerns the
character of change, which we see today as urgently needed and
involving a revolutionary change in (or return to a prior and
more healthy set of) human values.
Summary
Listed and described below are the six models:
1.  Bongaarts 1992:  estimates the relative impact of population
growth, GDP/cap, energy intensity and carbon intensity on Carbon
Dioxide emissions and global warming.  Bongaarts considers the
world as a whole, then groups countries according to those with
more and less developed economies.  For time horizons, Bongaarts
looks into the future, from 1985 to 2100.
2.  Clark 1992:  also deals with the relative impact of
population growth, GDP/capita, and energy intensity on Carbon
Dioxide emissions.  His analysis, however, examines the
historical development  in 12 countries over approximately the
past 50 years.
3.  Harrison 1992:  presents a series of two sector calculations,using Commoner's 1972 approach.  Like Clark, Harrison examines
the relative impact of population growth, consumption, and
technology on recent changes in a series of environmental
conditions
4.  Meadows 1992:  is the updated WORLD3 model originally used in
the 1972 Club of Rome's LIMITS TO GROWTH study.  It has five
sectors, each with a number of indicators, dynamically related to
each other with a range of positive and negative feedback loops.
The study runs a number of extremely enlightening, different
future scenarios.
5.  IIASA:  (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis)
presents a multisectoral framework suggesting how multi-indicator
societal, ecological, and economic subsystems are linked
together.  From this complex framework, a model of population and
environment dynamics is developed specifically for Mauritius.
6. CIESIN:  (Consortium for International Earth Science
Information Network) is a multisectoral framework for the human
dimensions of global environmental change.  It parallels the
Bretherton "wiring diagram" of atmospheric, oceanic, and
terrestrial relations, which gave human activities the status of
a single small black box.  The new CIESIN framework has been
illustratively applied to issues of sea level rise, human
migration, and energy consumption.
Six Models
Bongaarts 1992
In this Population Council working paper, John Bongaarts attempts
to estimate the relative impact of five conditions on Carbon
Dioxide emissions and thus on global warming.  The basic model he
uses is:
T = P x G x E x C + D,
where P (Population Size) times G (GDP/capita) produces GDP (or
total economic output).  GDP times E (Energy Intensity) produces
Total Energy Consumption (TEC).  TEC times C (Carbon Intensity:
CI) produces Carbon Emission from Fossil Fuel Consumption (FFCE).
FFCE plus D (Deforestation) produces T (Total Carbon Emission
Rate).
In our formulation, this amounts to examining the impact of
population growth on one narrow condition of the environment,
Carbon Dioxide emissions and the assumed link to global warming.
Different types of technology and organization are indicated by
energy and carbon intensity.
Bongaarts drops tropical deforestation and does not specify a
population component in this dimension of change.  He then uses
data from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make estimates
of the impact of population growth on total emissions.  He
accepts the general assumptions of the impact of carbon emission
on global warming.  The model is run from 1985 to 2025 and 2100,
and the global totals are separated into LDC and MDC regions.Bongaarts calculates the population component as "the
proportional reduction in the average Carbon Dioxide emission
growth rate that would occur if population size is kept constant
after 1985 [rather than growing as projected], and if, the
projected future trends in the per capita emission rate remain
unaffected"  (p 17, bold added).  This amounts to holding
constant the general technology and organization of energy
consumption and noting the difference between projected
population growth and no population growth.  These important
qualifications and assumptions produce a very simple scenario
that is useful for identifying the different potential population
growth impacts in LDCs and MDCs.  We can summarize the results as
follows:
Table 1.  Percent Contribution of Population Growth to Carbon
Emission Increase
    PERIOD          LDC       MDC       TOTAL
    1985-2025       53%       42%       50%
    2025-2100       39%        3%       22%
    1985-2100       48%       16%       35%
In this model, population growth contributes substantially (50%)
to world total Carbon Dioxide emissions for the near term.  The
impact declines markedly to 22% for the last three-quarters of
the next century.  More important is that the major impact of
population growth comes in the LDCs after 2025.  What is
somewhat surprising in these estimates is the large role that
population growth plays in carbon emission increases in the
developed world before 2025.  The explanation comes from the
estimates of carbon emission increases.  These are expected to be
less than 1% per year in developed countries, where population
growth, due to past momentum, is expected to be just under 0.5%
per year.  In the less developed countries, population growth is
expected to be 1.56% per year between 1985 and 2025.  Carbon
emissions are expected to rise at 2.94% per year.  Thus, in the
LDCs, population growth plays a larger role, resulting in a much
higher rate of carbon emissions than is expected in more
developed countries.
Bongaarts runs the calculations out to 2100 to show the
substantial drop in the impact of population growth in more
developed countries and its sustained impact in less developed
countries.  We cannot consider such projections to be considered
very accurate, of course.  But, they are useful to point to the
importance of the momentum that attends population growth.  They
also lead to a clear policy implication.
Clearly, reducing population growth in the LDCs could play a
major role in lessening future global warming.
This is important, since, as I argue, the world has both the
technology and the organizational capacity to reduce human
fertility and thus population growth rates.  What is lacking is
the political and religious or moral resolution of the debate
over the importance of reducing human fertility and population
growth rates.The Bongaarts' findings would also provide a strong justification
for increasing global financial assistance to population issues
if we could show that global population assistance has a
significant impact on population policy formation or on fertility
limitation program performance.
Unfortunately, such a linkage is impossible to demonstrate
statistically at the global or regional level (Ness 1989).  My
own past research (in Asia) on this issue shows that the
important determinants of policy formation, program performance,
and fertility decline are at the national rather than the
international level.  Further, more recent work (Zhang,
forthcoming 1994) [note 4] suggests that the dominant
determinants of demographic change for all regions of the world
are found at the national and local levels.  Zhang also suggests
that international population assistance may have only very
limited impact, either on policy formation or on program
performance.  Finally, there is abundant anecdotal evidence that
the sheer amount of international financial assistance is less
important than:  a) giving quality assistance and b) the
political-administrative capacity of the recipient country.
Do not take this as an argument against international population
assistance.  It is simply   a warning against expecting simple
and homogeneous global level results.  In addition, following our
basic human ecological perspective, it suggests that
international population assistance will work best if flexible
and readily adaptable to local conditions of human social
organization.
Clark 1992
Clark begins with the appropriately modest response, "We don't
know," to the question of what have been the "large scale
patterns of covariance in population and environment around the
world" (p 2).  He then makes a modest attempt, not at theory or
model building, but at quantitative documentation of the impact
of population growth and economic development on Carbon Dioxide
emissions for 12 countries for about the last 50 years (generally
1925-1985).  Clark looks backward for empirical relationships
rather than to forward projections.  He maintains that increases
in understanding come from examining past events more precisely
and accurately.
Clark uses Paul Ehrlich's identity as his basic framework:
X/A  =  P/A  x  $/P  x  X/$
where:  X/A is pollution per square kilometer,
        P/A is population per square kilometer
        $/P is GDP/capita, and
        X/$ is the pollution per unit of GDP.
This identity is transformed to a simple statement focusing on
fossil fuel carbon emissions (C) that derive from the combination
of population growth (P), economic production ($), and the carbon
dioxide (C) produced per unit of production, orC/A  =  P/A x $/P x C/$.
The countries for which Clark assembles data include:  Canada,
Japan, the UK, and the USA representing the highly industrialized
countries;  China, Poland, and the USSR, for centrally-planned
economies; Brazil, India, and Indonesia for the poor developing
countries; and Kenya and Zaire, for the more stagnant poor
countries.
Clark produces an ingenious analysis of the relative impact over
time and space of population growth, economic development, and
energy intensity.  A three-dimensional graph locates each of the
12 countries with respect to the relative impact of these three
conditions on Carbon Dioxide emissions over the past few decades.
The bottom line of this analysis should come as no surprise but
is well worth emphasizing:  no single factor  -- population,
development, or energy intensity -- dominates changing patterns
of Carbon Dioxide emissions over time and place.  Each dominates
at some time and place for all 12 countries.  For example, since
1955, population growth has dominated in Zaire and Kenya.
Economic development has dominated in Japan and China.  And
reductions in energy intensity have dominated in Canada and the
USA.
This represents a call for country-specific studies of population
and other determinants  of environmental impact or Carbon Dioxide
emissions.  It also suggests that interventions to protect the
environment should be aimed at a variety of production and
consumption patterns as well as at population growth.
It is important to note a qualification of the Bongaarts and
Clark studies of the population-environment relationship.  They
both use only Carbon Dioxide emissions to indicate environmental
degradation.  Clark notes that such degradation goes far beyond
Carbon Dioxide emissions, and for different forms, we can expect
different relative population impacts.  Population growth may
have a substantial direct impact on land use changes and on the
production of human wastes, but its connection to toxic or
hazardous waste production may be far more tenuous.
Thus, one research suggestion emerging from these studies is to
examine the impact of population growth on a variety of different
forms of environmental degradation.
Harrison 1992
Harrison takes a step toward multi-country and multi-impact
studies.  He uses Commoner's (1972) identity, which is similar to
the Erlich identity used by Clark, except that it omits the
aerial denominator.  For Harrison:
Pollution = Pop X Goods/Pop X Pollutant/Goods.
The Goods/Pop ratio represents consumption, and the
Pollutant/Goods ratio represents technology.  Thus Harrison, and
Commoner before him, can estimate the relative impact of changes
in population, consumption, or technology on environmentalimpact.  They estimated changes for four types of environmental
impacts for less- and more-developed countries for the past two
to three decades.  Table 2 summarizes Harrison's calculations.
Note that technological change reduces environmental impact on
land and livestock by increasing the yields per area and animal.
It also reduces air pollution in the OECD countries by cleaning
emissions.  Only in fertilizer use has technology also increased
environmental impacts.  Note, too, that population growth exerts
a substantial pressure on environmental degradation even in the
more developed countries.  In the case of Carbon Dioxide
emissions, Harrison's calculations are not strikingly different
from those of Bongaarts in that population growth currently (or
for  Bongaarts for the next few decades) exerts a substantial
impact in both more and less developed countries.
Presenting a vision of the future, Harrison begins with the
Boserup perspective that population growth drives technological
change.  When populations grow they ress upon their environments
and cause problems of stress.  These problems lead to various
forms of deprivation, which lead people to develop new tools and
practices to alleviate the stress.  In the process, humans
increase their productivity.  But they also increase their impact
on the environment, leading to another round of stresses and
problems, which then can lead to another round of technological
improvements.  However, Harrison notes something that Boserup
neglects.  There may be important delays in the technological
developments that relieve the stress.  Here Harrison begins to
address an issue that Meadows, Meadows, and Randers make more
explicit, the problem of overshoot, which we will address
shortly.
Table 2.  Relative Impact of Change in Population, Consumption,
and Technology on Various Forms of Environmental Change.




LDCs                          +72%        +28%         -100%
MDC                           +46%        +54%         -100%
Livestock numbers 1961-85
LDCs                          +69%        +31%         -100%
MDCs                          +59%        +41%         -100%
Fertilizer use 1961-88
LDCs                          +22%         +8%         +70%
MDCs                          +21%        +18%         +60%
Air Pollution change 1970-88
OECD                          +25%        +75%         -100%
Carbon Dioxide Emissions* 1960-88
LDCs                          46%           -         -
MDCs                          35%           -         -
---------------------------------------------------------------
*Using population alone in what Harrison calls his "short
method."However, there is another qualification to note in all three of
these studies.  They all consider population as a one dimensional
condition, marked by its growth rate.  Further, they appear to
assume that growth comes only from natural increase.  They do not
consider migration.  This is necessary, of course, for Bongaarts'
global estimates but is not for separate regional or national
estimates.  We can use these simple models to raise awareness of
both the impact of population growth, and the limits of that
impact on one aspect of global environmental change.  However,
the models are not very useful for more focused policy
considerations.  It is quite obvious, for example, that
population growth from natural increase will have very different
impacts on the environment than will increases due to migration.
Migration has not been included in any of these considerations
and tends to emerge in environmental issues only in the case of
"environmental refugees."
One research implication from this qualification is the
indication to differentiate the population growth that comes from
natural increase from that which comes from migration.
A second research implication calls for separating the population
into a number of variable dimensions (e.g., age/gender
distributions, rural/urban distributions) to note the
differential impacts on various aspects of environmental change.
For this more sensitive type of analysis, we need to deal with
many different dimensions of both population and the environment.
The multisectoral models permit us to do this, though even they
represent only a first step.
Meadows 1992
This new study, updating the 1972 LIMITS TO GROWTH study, is
certain to have a substantial impact on the world community
concerned with development and the environment.  Like its
predecessor, it will most likely be the subject of intense, often
heated, and sometimes possibly even enlightening debate.  Since
it is likely to be important to world thinking, we include a
discussion of it here.
The authors use the same WORLD3 model used for the 1972 Club of
Rome analysis, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH.  The authors reviewed it and
revised some of the parameters and coefficients.  The model has
225 variables and makes estimates every six months from 1900 to
2100.  It establishes a complex set of linkages with both
positive and negative feedbacks in and between five sectors:
population, agriculture (including food production, land
fertility, development and loss), economy (including industrial
and services output and jobs), persistent pollution, and
nonrenewable resources.  The authors note that it is not a
complicated model because it treats all conditions globally.  It
does not distinguish among regions or countries nor among
specific resources or pollutants.
The population variables include those affecting both the supply
and demand sides of human fertility.  They link life expectancy,
perceived life expectancy, industrial output per capita and its
relationship to family income and income expectations to desiredcompleted family size for the demand side.  On the supply side is
the output of the service sector and the proportion of services
allocated to family planning.  They also include a series of
basic demographic conditions, such as proportions in and
mortality rates of four major age categories: 0-14, 15-44, 45-64,
and over 64.
The environment, as in other cases, is marked by all other four
sectors.  Persistent pollution includes measures for both
industrial and agricultural emissions and their toxicity.
Nonrenewable resources includes a single gross estimate of their
stocks plus the technology both to extract and to conserve those
stocks.  Agriculture includes land yields, the impact of air
pollution, the technology for increasing land yields and
protecting soil from erosion.   And the economy includes all
industrial output with needed capital and resources, plus the
inputs into services and agriculture.
The basic driving force of the model is exponential growth in
both population and capital or the economy.  Both have the
capacity to reproduce themselves and thus to grow exponentially.
Exponential growth provides the potential for overshoot.  This
excess can be avoided if signals of growth rates that will exceed
environmental limits are accurate and timely, if they are
perceived and acted upon,  and if corrective actions are timely
and effective .
Since the original LIMITS TO GROWTH proved so controversial, it
is useful to state the authors' original conclusions, largely
neglected in the debates of the time.  They concluded that:
1) the present growth of the population and economy is
unsustainable and would likely lead to a collapse or
uncontrollable decline of population and industrial output in
about 100 years;
2) it is possible to alter current trends and to produce the
conditions of economic and ecological sustainability, and that
this can be done along with providing a high quality of life for
everyone; and finally
3) if society decides to aim for sustainability, the sooner it
does so the better.
The slight revisions made in the model have not altered those
conclusions.  Current growth rates and patterns are beyond the
limits and cannot be sustained.  The patterns of unsustainable
growth need not continue, however.  But to change these patterns
requires a change of human aim from economic growth to
development.  They argue that growth has not in the past and
cannot in the future solve problems of poverty, unemployment or
low living standards.  We can have a better life for all,
however, by focusing on sustainable development, rather than on
growth.
The WORLD3 model reproduces the period 1900-1990 quite
accurately, giving us an important validation.  The authors then
examined a large number of scenarios testing different
assumptions about changing rates.  Each run produces about 90,000numbers.  The authors simplify this by providing two graphs,
dating from 1900 to 2100 for each scenario examined in the text.
One shows the world system, with resources, food, population,
pollution, and industrial output.  A second graph shows living
standards, with life expectancy, food per capita, services per
capita, and consumer goods per capita.  None of the graphs show
absolute values, and only a few year points are noted.  Thus, the
graphs can not be interpreted precisely.  This tactic reinforces
the authors' argument that these are not real or precise
predictions, which they believe are not possible.  They do
believe, however, that the broad structure of changes is accurate
and that the linkages in the model are correct.  For the purposes
of our analysis, some of their more important findings are as
follows:
Continuing current growth patterns, or business as usual, will
result in sustained growth to about 2010, with population peaking
above 7 billion, followed by a major decline in population,
industrial output, and standards of living starting around 2015.
Population falls to below current levels by 2100.  The costs of
extracting resources, increasing food production, and pollution
abatement rise.  Pollution and erosion reduce soil fertility, and
investment cannot keep ahead of depreciation or provide for new
capital goods.   This leads to a decline in food production and
health services, reducing life expectancy and raising the death
rate.
If assumptions double the resource levels, collapse still
follows, postponed by only a few years.
If we introduce four major types of technological fixes, all of
which reduce pollution and increase energy efficiency, collapse
still follows, again slightly delayed.
If world population growth falls to replacement level in 1995, it
reaches 6 billion in 2000 and 7.4 billion in 2040.  After that it
declines as the costs of pollution and finding new resources
rises, and industrial and food output fall.
A sustainable scenario is achieved by halting population growth,
with replacement level at 1995, limiting consumer goods per
capita to $350 (constant 1968 prices) [note 5], and putting into
place the four major environment protection technologies used in
earlier scenarios.  This produces a population of 7.7 billion,
with a life expectancy of 80 years, services per capita 210%
above the 1990 level, enough food for everyone, or a global
living standard equal to that of western Europe today.  It is a
system in dynamic equilibrium.
Two other scenarios are of considerable interest.  Had the world
limited population and industrial output and put in place the
protective technologies in 1975, 20 years earlier, we would have
reached dynamic equilibrium with a stable population of 5.7
billion early in the next century.  We could have  very high
living standards for all, less stress on the environment, and
resources to last far into the future.
On the other hand, if the world establishes these limits and
protective technologies in 2015, 20 years later, there will be a
partial collapse, or turbulence around the middle of the nextcentury, but with the possibility of recovery.  That is, there
will be an overshoot of population and output beyond sustainable
limits; they will decline rapidly then waver around the limits
until a new equilibrium may be reached.  In this scenario,
population rises to 8.7 billion, then falls to 7.4 billion.
The authors acknowledge important qualifications of the study.
These are not predictions, they are model runs.  The authors do
not believe that predictions of this precision are possible.
They use the model to show the implications of current patterns
of growth and to understand the requirements for sustainability.
They believe that the main linkages and parameters of the model,
and its basic structure, are correct.
Furthermore, they note that the model is probably biased in an
optimistic direction, because it does not take account of war,
corruption, strikes, or extreme climate events.  It assumes that
people do their best to solve problems.  All of this is quite
unrealistic, of course.  Greater realism, however, is found in
other assumptions, especially those concerning delays.  For
example, they assume that once implemented, it will take 20 years
for pollution abatement technology to be fully effective.
We should make one additional qualification which may increase
the optimistic bias of the model.  Although this is a global
model, it does not incorporate any of the outputs from the Global
Circulation Models that predict a global warming (IPCC 1990, EPA
1989).  Projections of greenhouse gas emissions show a doubling
of Carbon Dioxide by the middle of the next century, with
continued increases thereafter.  From this, predictions of global
warming of between 1 and 4 degrees Celsius are made.  These
global projections cannot be resolved to regional levels
sufficiently small to provide much assistance in predicting the
impact of warming on land use or economic activities.  It is
likely to affect the temperate regions more than the tropics.
Many currently productive agricultural areas may face increased
warming and drying.  Nor does WORLD3 include potential impacts of
ozone destruction, which can be expected to have deleterious
effects on human health, and probably on food production as well
[note 6].  If any of these scenarios prove to be valid, the
demands for change in the Meadows models will be much greater.
And the extent and character of the collapses without these
changes undoubtedly will be more extreme.
For our purposes, perhaps the most important conclusions are:
Current patterns of population and industrial growth are not
sustainable.
Technological environmental protection fixes alone will not
prevent collapse.
Halting population growth alone will not avert collapse.
Sustainability can be achieved at high standards of living for
all the world's current population and more.
Achieving sustainability will require limiting both population
and industrial growth and putting in place a wide range of
environmentally protective technologies.IIASA
The International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis has
undertaken a wide range of sophisticated studies of environmental
changes, and much of this includes population activities [note
7].
The IIASA basic framework is one of a Socio-ecological system
(figure 1 in Appendix), with three major sub-systems: Societal,
Ecological, and Economic.  It contains 40 distinct boxes of
variables or conditions, such as population size and structure,
quality of life, capital stock, pollution, and quality of the
natural environment.  These are linked through a great variety of
direct and indirect connections, all of which can be specified.
From this general framework, IIASA developed a model of
population-environment dynamics for Mauritius (Appendix, figure
2).  This has five modules, each of which contains a specific set
of measures relevant to Mauritius.  All are linked together in
either prescribed ways ("hard wired") or are left to the analyst
to prescribe.  The modules include population, economy, water,
land use, and policy.  The population module is a "multi-state
population projection module with seven specified stages" (Lutz
1991: 14).  It includes age and gender distributions, educational
attainment, labor force participation, and migration.  The
environment is specified in two modules, for land use and for
water.  In all cases, the specific modules, their elements and
the linkages within and between modules are developed
specifically for Mauritius.  The model is set up to run five-year
equilibrium states from 1990 to 2050 but also has data from 1960
to 1990.  This is both to validate the model and to show what
would have been the conditions had Mauritius not experienced the
widespread fertility decline that has brought it to the
conclusion of its demographic transition.
To date (September 1992), a number of working papers (Lutz 1990,
Pandit 1990, Prinz 1992) examine a variety of population and
development scenarios for the future, past demo-graphic changes,
and the character of labor force changes.  Although Mauritius is
a small island nation, its rapid demographic and economic change
over the past three decades offers considerable encouragement for
those seeking to promote sustainable development.  In the span of
just 30 years, it went through a demographic transition.  It
changed from a poor, agricultural, newly-independent nation with
high rates of unemployment and import-substitution policies.
Mauritius is now a low-fertility, fully-employed society with
good future prospects for sustained development.  The application
to Mauritius demonstrates the real utility of the IIASA
Population-Environment model.  We can use the model to understand
the character of past changes and to chart the future according
to a wide variety of assumptions in an exercise that has
important implications for local policy.
This type of framework application and model building has a great
deal to recommend it, especially for designing specific
interventions.  It shares much of the complexity found in the
Meadows global model, but it is location specific and of direct
use for policy and planning.  It selects specific modules for the
relevance to the specific case and also selects both elements and
conditions of those modules on the basis of empirical evidence.For example, in the land use module, there is a measure for
"beaches."  Although these constitute a very small portion of the
total land area, they have high economic value.  Beaches are
related to tourism, one of the island's main earners of foreign
exchange and likely to be of growing importance.
It is also a model that reflects our basic philosophy or
orientation, that population-environment relations are mediated
by organization and technology.  Lutz presents their model's
philosophy as follows:
"...the causal linkages between changes in population size and
structure and changes in the environment are far from being
direct and constant over time and space.  Only in minor ways does
the sheer number of people directly affect the environment (such
as Carbon Dioxide emissions by human breathing).  The major human
impacts on the natural environment depend on prevailing
technologies, soils   and climate, as well as patterns of culture
and consumption" (Lutz 1991: 11).
I would argue that even in the connection between human breathing
and Carbon Dioxide emission there is an organizational component.
The age structure of a population, for example, will have an
impact on the rate of Carbon Dioxide emissions.  Age structures
are very much a product of human vital rates and migration, which
are clearly affected by the technology and organization of the
population.
Neither Lutz' nor our formulation implies that the number of
people in any environment, or on the entire planet, is
unimportant.  Numbers and their rates of growth or decline are
vital to both environ-mental conditions and to the quality of
both current and future human life.  These formulations do say,
however, that there is no single population problem.  Halting or
reducing population growth rates alone will not solve the basic
problem of creating a sustainable society.  This is especially
important since it rejects the idea, common in some circles, that
the world's problem lies primarily in the population growth rates
of the less developed countries.  The simplistic focus on Third
World population growth rates results in a level of conflict that
obstructs the development of effective
global solutions.
CIESIN
In 1988, Francis Bretherton (Fisher 1988) produced a "wiring
diagram" showing the links between the physical climate system
and biogeochemical cycles.  This was part of the growing industry
of research on atmospheric change that underpins the global
warming perspective. (See Drennan and Chapman 1992.  EPAT/MUCIA
Policy Brief No. 1 reviews the atmospheric and warming processes
and issues.)  The Bretherton diagram traced most of the major
linkages that produced climate change.  It provided a road map
that could be used to establish research priorities.  At one edge
of the diagram is a black box, labelled human activities.  These
activities generate pollutants and Carbon Dioxide and have
specific land use patterns that affect the terrestrial ecosystem,
a major element in the diagram.  The human activities black box
also receives inputs from the terrestrial ecosystem element andclimate change from the element labeled atmospheric
physics/dynamics.
This diagram is helpful to the atmospheric sciences community and
to climate modelers.  However, it raises many questions for
social scientists and for interdisciplinary groups concerned with
the human dimensions of global environmental change (Jacobson
1990).  In 1991, a small group of social scientists met at the
Aspen Global Change Institute to develop a parallel "wiring
diagram" on the HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
(CIESIN 1992).
The CIESIN diagram has seven sets of conditions: six internal and
one external. Within the system are Preferences and Expectations,
Political Systems, Factors of Production and Technology,
Population, Economic System and Global Scale Environmental
Processes.  It is through the latter that this framework is
linked to the Bretherton framework.  The one external set of
conditions is the Fund of Knowledge and Experience.
One interesting development in this framework is the
specification of three speeds in the connecting links.  Slow
speeds are a century or more; moderate speeds are a generation,
and fast speeds are months to a few years.  All of the linkages
of the elements to global environmental processes are either
moderate or slow.
As yet, this is merely a framework suggesting the major elements
and the linkages that should be examined.  We need to understand
how human activities affect, and are affected by, the climate and
biogeochemical systems that Bretherton identified.  To use such a
framework, we must identify elements relevant to a particular
problem and specify and quantify variables within those elements.
In addition, we must specify or measure the linkages, usually in
the form of some change coefficient.  None of this has yet been
done, but the CIESIN team has developed three brief scenarios to
illustrate how to translate the framework into researchable
projects.
This research takes two general directions, adaptation and
mitigation.  That is, one can ask what changes can we expect in
the world's ecosystem from the enhanced greenhouse effect and
global warming.  We can also ask what adaptations can we expect
from the human community to these changes?  One can also ask,
however, what human activities are driving or "forcing" which
environmental changes, and how can we alter these activities to
mitigate them?  The CIESIN document provides illustrations of
both types of questions.
One scenario deals with the impact of sea level rise on human
activities, illustrating the adaptive type of question.  Another
asks how a tax on fossil fuels might mitigate atmospheric forcing
by reducing Carbon Dioxide emissions through changes in human
production and consumption patterns.
A third scenario asks how climate change might affect human
migration (figure 5 in Appendix).  This is the only point at
which the CIESIN framework touches directly on population issues.
Note that the question is one of adaptation not mitigation.  Itproposes that climate changes will change land use, especially
the location and character of agriculture.  Historically, the
small labor intensive, subsistence farmers are most affected by
this type of change.  The common strategy for the farmer is to
migrate in search of more opportunities.  This illustration
suggests that in this situation, "...birth and death rates may
remain high as households diversify strategies and try to
counteract rising uncertainties by increasing their number of
children"  (CIESIN 1992: 42).  In the absence of increased
agricultural opportunities, however, this would increase
migration into urban areas, which might then lead to lower
fertility.
All of these models provide useful observations, but they speak
to different audiences and have slightly different implications.
Bongaarts, Clark, and Harrison all speak to a more general
audience.  They aim basically at raising awareness of both the
magnitude of environmental changes and the relative impact of
population growth, increasing consumption, and changing
technology.  They all tell us that population growth has a major
impact on environmental degradation, but that it is not alone in
its influence.  Rising consumption also has an important impact
in both more and less developed countries.  Further,
technological change works in both degrading and conserving ways.
It can increase environmental degradation through land clearing,
deforestation, and especially through the emission of toxic
substances into air, land, and water.  None, however, examines
the links among the various conditions that affect the
environment.
That is done in the final three models.  All three are concerned
with the dynamic relationships among a variety of human social
organizational and technological conditions.  They all permit the
examination of feedback processes, and both Meadows and the IIASA
models actually attempt to estimate the direction and magnitude
of these processes.  The Meadows model deals with the entire
global system, however, and thus carries fewer policy
implications for any specific government.  Its implications are
for the global community as a whole.  The IIASA model is designed
specifically to be applied to individual countries.  Thus, it has
the greatest potential for developing policy implications for
individual governments.  The CIESIN model has the same potential,
but it has not yet been developed in any specifically applied
form.
The Issue of Scale
The frameworks and models examined here are composite national or
global models.  They all deal with large territories presided
over by large scale political and economic organizations, resting
on widely shared values.  There is little attention to the micro
level, the level of individual behavior.  There is consequently,
little attention to values and attitudes and to the relation
between attitude and behavior.Typically, as we scale up to higher and higher levels, we lose a
rich array of variables, and can deal with combined atmospheric
emission or population growth.  As we scale down to smaller
communities and to individual behavior, we add a great number of
variables.
On the population side, there are extensive studies of the
determinants of fertility.  In these studies the large scale
probability sample survey is the tool of observation and
analysis.  Here it is the individual who is the unit of analysis,
and the range of variables has become substantial.  At this
level, values and attitudes, as well as contextual social,
cultural, economic and political conditions come into play.  The
World Fertility Survey, and its successor, the Demographic and
Health Survey, illustrate this type of analysis.  It may be
called one of the most massive social science projects ever
carried out.  More recently, survey research is applied to
environmental values and such behavior as recycling or voting for
environmental protection measures.
Unfortunately, the problem of disciplinary specialization once
again arises to diminish our understanding.  The fertility
surveys that tell us so much about human reproduction provide no
comparable information about attitudes or behaviors relevant to
the environment.  Similarly, studies of environ-mental attitudes
and behaviors are silent on reproduction.  There are also
extensive studies of agricultural practices and family income,
industrial work, individual and household consumption patterns,
political attitudes and voting behavior.  Almost none of these
studies relates very much to the other or to population and
environment relationships.
We do not yet have the tools to link these micro-level studies to
the more global issues.  However, there is good reason to propose
both the extension of the micro-level studies and an increase in
their interdisciplinary character.  The National Research
Council's GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN
DIMENSION (Stern, Young, and Druckman 1990, chapter 8) includes
one extensive set of recommendations for such studies.  A
subsequent paper in this series will discuss using the
Environmental Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (EKAP) survey to
build upon the very successful family planing KAP studies.
The Character of Change
Harrison's title reflects an important vision that appears now to
be growing throughout the world.  This is also reflected in the
Meadows discussion of policy implications as they, too, speak of
the coming Third Revolution.  First came the agricultural
revolution six to eight millennia ago.  Then came the industrial
revolution just two centuries ago.  Together these have given the
human species   an unprecedented capacity to affect the global
environment.  The magnitude of this impact is both unprecedented
and dangerous.  It carries the capacity to render the entire
planet unfit for human, and perhaps for all, life.  Addressingthe problem raised by this massive human assault on the global
system will require a new, or Third Revolution.  This revolution
must move toward the use of cleaner energy, based on renewable
resources and the limitation of human consumption.
Thus both Harrison and the Meadows see the need for a radical
change in the near future if we are to build a sustainable world
society.  Meadows and to a lesser extent Harrison, see that this
radical change will involve a change in the human spirit, or
something Meadows calls visioning.  This implies looking to a
future that is better than the present, especially in the
character  of the human spirit and human values.  This future
must first be seen; then the vision must lead to action to
realize the new aims.  The list contains 16 elements of the new
vision.  It includes such things as social values of equity and
justice with material sufficiency and security for all as well as
leaders who are honest and respectful.  Work must dignify rather
than demean people.  The list contains specific sustainable
conditions for energy, agriculture, technology, political
organizations, and the media.
Underlying all is the vision that the "reasons for living and for
thinking well of oneself that do not require the accumulation of
material things." (1992: 226)  This is a call for a radical
change in basic human values.
U.S. Vice President Albert Gore makes the same basic argument in
his recent book, EARTH IN THE BALANCE, ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN
SPIRIT (1992).  He devotes a chapter to "Environmentalism of the
Spirit," which summons up basic values from many religions that
speak to the need for a less materialistic set of values.  He
also quotes the Pope's observation that "...the seriousness of
the ecological issue lays bare the depths of man's moral crisis."
(1992: 263)  Similarly, Gerard Piel (1992) ends his ONLY ONE
WORLD: OUR OWN TO MAKE AND TO KEEP with an emphasis on value
change.  "As the present doubling of the population proceeds,
people must accomplish the necessary reconstruction of their
values and institutions.  We have not much more than a century to
find our way..." (1992: 328).
It might not be unusual for a political leader or a scientist-
journalist to argue for a moral or ethical approach to modern
problems, attempting to blend science and religion.  It is not
common, however, to find a scientist, especially an economist,
and a theologian teaming up to write a technical book on
sustainable development.  Yet this is precisely what we have in
the influential book by Daly and Cobb (1989), FOR THE COMMON
GOOD:  REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARDS COMMUNITY, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.  Their development of a
new accounting system to correct the deplorable environmental
blindness of the national income account is welcome.  But, it is
also part of a growing concern for the shortcomings of national
income accounting (Repetto 1989, Lutz and El Serafy 1988).  More
radical, however, is their sustained attack on the
mathematization of economics.  They cite such notable figures as
Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, who said that
"...econometricians fit algebraic functions...to essentially same
set of data without being able to advance...a systematic
understanding of the structure and operations of a real economic
system" (1989: 32).  If our current situation leads to this typeof attack on the very technological core of scientific economics,
the situation must indeed be grave.
Much more could be cited, but this should suffice to illustrate
the point.  There is today a sense of urgency about the
population-environment relationship, which calls for a radical,
revolutionary change.  Much of that change must involve basic
human values.
Conclusions
What can we take away from this review of past and current
thinking about the population-environment relationship that we
could use for current development strategies and tactics?  Let me
begin with an observation about two research cultures, then make
four general observations.  Later papers in this series will draw
out more fully the research implications of these observations.
Two Research Cultures
We can identify two distinct research cultures in the area of
environmental change.  These have developed with different tools
and are looking at two quite different aspects of the general
problem   of global environmental change.  There is, as yet,
little work to bring these two cultures together, but it is
highly likely that much can be gained by a closer integration.
Atmospheric Sciences
One culture emerges largely from atmospheric sciences and
climatology.  Here the rise of greenhouse or trace gasses is the
prominent observation.  There is also extensive theoretical
development suggesting that the long term result of this
atmospheric forcing will be a rise in the earth's temperature.
If we do experience a rise of 4 degrees Celsius over the next
century or two, this may well constitute the most rapid
temperature change the planet has ever experienced.  The
prospects for a massive impact on the human population are quite
pronounced.
One result of global warming will almost certainly be a rise in
the sea level.  Even so, recent estimates of the extent of the
rise tend to be more moderate than earlier estimates.  Further
uncertainty emerges from the observation that a rise in sea level
from simple thermal expansion will be offset in some areas by
uprising and worsened in others by lowering.  In any event, the
prospect of even moderate rises could produce massive upheavals
and migration in such areas as Bangladesh.  This could also have
profound impacts on many of the world's cities.In addition to global warming, with all of its uncertainties,
atmospheric changes also imply much more certain depletion of the
earth's ozone layer.  This is a depletion that will continue and
to which the human population will have to adapt.  Even assuming
the complete phasing out of the chlorofluoro-carbons, ozone
depletion will continue well into the next century due to the
lifetime of the gases already in the atmosphere.
There are two quite different implications of ozone depletion.
It appears that most scientific attention today may be directed
at the lesser of the two problems.  Ozone depletion means an
increase in ultraviolet radiation.  This causes skin cancer and
visual impairment and is receiving a great deal of attention.
But ultraviolet radiation also offers the prospect of crop losses
and possible destruction of phytoplankton, the base of the
ocean's food chain.  This indicates the need for more extensive
monitoring of ultraviolet radiation and its impact on basic life
structures.
Environmental Sciences
The environmental sciences have focused their attention on what
can be generally called environmental degradation.  This includes
deforestation, desertification, species destruction, and the
emission into the air, earth, and water of a series of
human-produced toxic chemicals.  All of these aspects of
degradation have or can have an immediate deleterious impact on
human life.  They reduce food projection and water availability
and produce substantial health hazards.
General Observations on Population-Environment Dynamics
Population Is Controversial
Population, especially fertility limitation, is a controversial
issue both in the abstract and in many, though not all, specific
locations [note 8].  This will often mitigate against linking
population and environ-mental projects as environmentalists will
often prefer to stay away from the potentially controversial
population issues.  One way around the controversy in population
is to focus on the maternal and child health dimensions of
fertility control.  Even this, however, cannot always work to
lessen the controversy sufficiently to bring population and
environmental issues together.
Specialization Builds Barriers
Specialization in disciplines and development agencies will
continue to keep population and environ-mental issues apart.  It
will also continue to sustain the considerable separation between
different aspects of the environmental problem.  We must design
special interdisciplinary and interagency activities to bring
population and environmental issues closer together.No Direct Population-environment Linkage
There is no direct connection between population and the
environment.  All linkages, in both directions, are mediated by
some form of organization or technology.
Slowing Population Growth Is no Panacea for Solving Environmental
Problems
Although growth is today one of the most dramatic aspects of the
population dynamics, growth is not the only problem affecting the
population-environment relationship.  Slowing population growth
rates, especially in the developing world, will have many
beneficial effects, including improving human health and reducing
environmental stress.  At the same time, it is clear that slowing
population growth alone will not do very much to reduce
environmental stress, especially in the next decade.
The basic lesson is that both population growth and global change
are joint products of the revolutionary switch to fossil fuels
that has brought unprecedented increases in living standards to
so many people.  In effect, these population and environmental
changes are the result of the human species' great successes in
exploiting the environment.  Here is a deep paradox.  The human
species may have been so successful in exploiting the environment
that it will make the planet far less habitable to all forms of
life.  Our success is producing both atmospheric changes and
environmental degradation that may drastically reduce the
planet's carrying capacity for our own future generations.
As the Meadows study has shown, however, the current trends in
population and economic growth are neither inevitable nor
irreversible.  The human species has the technological capacity
to alter patterns of production and consumption and to produce
higher standards of life for all people in a sustainable system.
It remains to be seen whether the human species will be
sufficiently wise and well-organized to make the next revolution
to sustainable society.
We shall probably know within the next two decades whether the
current population-environment dynamic processes will lead to
collapse or to sustainability.
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"Environment, Development and Systems Analysis."  OPTIONS.
Vienna, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems
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IIASA Population-Environment Model for Mauritius
Source: Lutz, Wolfgang.   1991.  "Population, Environment and
Development: A case Study of Mauritius."   OPTIONS.  Vienna,
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA).
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CIESIN Bretherton "Wiring Diagram"
Source: Consortium for International Earth Science Information
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Arbor, Michigan: University Center.
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CIESIN Framework for Climate Change and Population Migration
Source: Consortium for International Earth Science Information
Network (CIESIN).  1992.  PATHWAYS OF UNDERSTANDING: THE
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1. Note that demography, usually closely related to and set in
sociology as a distinct discipline, has become a separate
discipline at the University of California, Berkeley.
2. Godwin married Mary Wollstonecraft, one of the early leaders
of the women's liberation movement.  Her book, A VINDICATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, originally published in 1792, is still
regarded as a classic in the modern struggle.  (See
Wollstonecraft 1988 for a modern review.)  Their relationship and
marriage was studiously arranged to protect her individual
integrity.  They both opposed marriage as an enslaving
institution but married to protect Mary's daughter by an American
adventurer.  The daughter was conceived in France where the
parents were both involved in post revolutionary activities.
3. Some of 18th century rationalism was worked out with great
violence against the British ruling class, of which Malthus was a
minor member.  The American revolution used a rationalist natural
law position to legitimize the revolt against authority and the
separation of the colonies from the crown.  In France, the crown
was being destroyed and rationalist thought was being pushed to
bloody conclusions.  All of this greatly threatened the British
ruling class and paved the way for the rise of 19th century
conservative thought.
4. Qun Zhang is currently analyzing worldwide and regional data
for a doctoral dissertation in Population Planning and
International Health at the University of Michigan.
5. Consumer goods are estimated to be about 40% of total material
industrial output.  The authors use estimates of total material
industrial output rather than GNP or GDP.  This measurement
provides a picture of real physical output less distorted by
prices, which they view as "values assigned by producers and
consumers who have power in the market."  The 1990 level of total
industrial output in 1968 prices is about $500 per capita for the
world as a whole.  This implies consumer goods per capita at
$200.
6. One of the more serious intelligence failures to come out of
current concerns with global warming is the lack of research on
the effect of ultraviolet radiation on both oceanic food chains
and agricultural output.  Currently, every time it is measured,
ozone depletion turns out to be of greater magnitude than
expected.  In addition, the major interest appears to be in the
cancer impact.  Unfortunately, that reflects the influence of
professional status and power systems rather than a more
scientific assessment of what might be the most important
environmental impact.
7. Nathan Keyfitz (1991) has been associated with the IIASA and
has produced some good theoretical statements about the
population-environment linkages.
8. In Asia (Ness and Ando 1984), population is less infused with
religious significance and interpretation than in other worldregions.  This is part of the reason that Asia has led the Third
World in adopting modern population policies and experiencing a
more rapid fertility decline than other regions.
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